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forcefully applied the so-called series-qualifier canon, which posits (among
other things) how postpositive modifiers normally attach to certain
antecedents. With this canon, the Court identified a presumptive natural
reading of the statute at issue, and that presumption framed the rest of the
Court’s analysis. Concurring only in the judgment, Justice Alito agreed with
the Court’s interpretation but expressed concern over the majority’s heavy
reliance on the canon. In Justice Alito’s view, the majority used the canon
too much like a rule, despite intuitive reasons to doubt its force.
Justice Alito’s intuitions were exactly right. The so-called seriesqualifier canon is an unjustified revision to a principle from a single case in
the 1920s—a case that itself materially distorted the real series-qualifier
principle that America borrowed from England. This Essay tells that story.
Drawing on formal linguistics and interpretive history, I explain that a seriesqualifier principle initially served a much smaller role than the contemporary
series-qualifier canon, a supposed “rule” that does not necessarily describe
ordinary English usage or processing. By relying on this contemporary
misstatement and not on the true series-qualifier principle, the Court in
Facebook committed a serious process error and potentially set up lower
courts to approach interpretation in a way that will undermine textualism’s
core commitments and goals.
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INTRODUCTION
Textualists like rules. Or, perhaps more accurately, they tend to prefer
rule-like ways of approaching interpretive problems.1 That may explain why
textualists like linguistic canons; these canons “apply rules of syntax to
statutes” so that interpreters can “decipher” and “effectuate” the
“legislature’s intent.” 2 This allows interpreters to approach problems
“methodically” so that they can “confirm their assumptions about the
‘common understanding’ of words.”3 But to serve that role, a canon needs
empirical support to justify that it actually describes how people use or
understand language. 4 After all, the appeal of linguistic canons—from a
textualist standpoint—is that they “reflect broader conventions of language
use” that are “common in society at large.”5

1
See Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 350 (2005) (noting “textualists’
apparent affinity for rule-like methods of interpretation”).
2
Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 117 & n.29
(2010). Linguistic canons contrast with “substantive” canons (like the rule of lenity) that “promote
policies external to a statute.” Id. at 117. The value of linguistic canons comes, in part, from their
purported ability to capture the realities of English usage, see id. at 117 n.29, which aids interpreters in
identifying an objectified—rather than subjective—legislative intent. See id. at 121 n.52 (observing that
textualists find value in linguistic canons because they help determine “how a statutory provision would
be understood by a skilled user of the language”); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., new ed. 2018)
(arguing that textualism pursues “objectified” legislative intent).
3
Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1170 n.5 (2021).
4
See, e.g., id. at 1174 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The strength and validity of an interpretive canon is
an empirical question . . . .”); Barrett, supra note 2, at 117 n.29 (“If one could demonstrate, through
empirical research or otherwise, that Congress does not write statutes against the backdrop of these
supposedly shared conventions, the rationale for their existence would evaporate.”).
5
Nelson, supra note 1, at 383; see also Barrett, supra note 2, at 117 n.29, 121 n.52.
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Some linguistic canons are justified by reference to rules of grammar.6
That makes sense: Formal grammar tries to describe how ordinary people
use language,7 and there are even reasons to believe that every human—
regardless of language—shares some innate, universal grammar that is built
into our brains.8 Insights about shared grammatical conventions can go a
long way toward guiding interpreters to resolve ambiguities in a way that
aligns with general (as opposed to idiosyncratic) usage or understanding.
Grammatical rules, then, have a lot of potential to help interpreters achieve
textualism’s goal: identifying “a sort of ‘objectified’ intent.”9
But some canons purport to rest on descriptive grammatical grounds
when they do no such thing. These supposed linguistic canons are dangerous.
Judges and lawyers are busy people, and they are not (generally speaking)
trained linguists. As a result, there are good reasons to think that judges and
lawyers lack the time and expertise to confirm or disprove the inherited
wisdom that a supposedly linguistic canon describes reality. Sometimes,
however, mere common sense—“a fortunate (though not inevitable) sidebenefit of construing statutory terms fairly” 10 —sounds the alarm that a
problem is afoot with a supposedly linguistic canon.
This just recently occurred at the Supreme Court. In Facebook v.
Duguid, an eight-Justice majority led by Justice Sotomayor sparred with
Justice Alito over the so-called series-qualifier canon.11 Per the majority, this
canon is an “interpretative rule” rooted in “rules of grammar.”12 The canon
provides that “‘[w]hen there is a straightforward, parallel construction that
involves all nouns or verbs in a series,’ a modifier at the end of the list
‘normally applies to the entire series.’”13 A colorful example from Justice
Kagan illustrates the principle: If a friend says she wants to meet “an actor,
director, or producer involved with the new Star Wars movie,” you will
likely understand that she wants to meet a member of the Star Wars cast, not
6

See, e.g., Facebook, 141 S. Ct. at 1169 (series-qualifier canon); Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20,
26 (2003) (Scalia, J.) (last antecedent rule). Because this Essay is from a textualist perspective, I denote
throughout when judicial authority is authored by one of the Supreme Court’s textualists. See infra notes
22, 24 and accompanying text (identifying textualist or textualist-leaning justices).
7
See BRYAN A. GARNER, THE CHICAGO GUIDE TO GRAMMAR, USAGE, AND PUNCTUATION 1 (2016).
8
See KERSTI BÖRJARS & KATE BURRIDGE, INTRODUCING ENGLISH GRAMMAR 10–11 (Routledge 2d
ed. 2010) (describing the universal grammar theory).
9
Scalia, supra note 2, at 17.
10
Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 179 (2014) (Kagan, J.).
11
Compare Facebook, 141 S. Ct. at 1173–75 (Alito, J., concurring) (questioning the canon’s use and
identifying situations when the canon does not apply), with id. at 1169, 1170 n.5 (majority opinion)
(responding to Justice Alito’s concerns).
12
Id. at 1169 (majority opinion).
13
Id. (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 147 (2012) (alteration in original)).
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just any actor.14 Whereas the Facebook majority found this canon useful for
cutting through a knotty textual problem that sharply divided the courts of
appeals, 15 Justice Alito concurred only in the judgment because of the
majority’s overreliance on this canon, which he feared was being used in too
much of a rule-like manner despite intuitive reasons to doubt its force.16
The Facebook debate tees up an important discussion about the socalled series-qualifier canon. The canon’s basic justification is syntactic; it
purports to be a rule about “the structure of sentences and phrases.”17 But in
fact, the canon necessarily rests on threshold judgments about semantics, i.e.,
“the meaning of words and how these meanings combine when words are
combined into phrases and sentences.”18
Recognizing the proper role of semantic judgment lends support to
much of Justice Alito’s qualified criticism of the series-qualifier canon in
Facebook.19 It also accords with the canon’s origins. This Essay aims to show
that the Facebook majority’s series-qualifier canon is a distorted outgrowth
of a much narrower principle. Whereas the canon as it exists today purports
to describe general syntactic use,20 the authorities on which it rests stand for
no such rule. Rather, the series-qualifier canon evolved from a principle that
was not used to resolve structural ambiguities with syntactic rules at the
outset; its narrower domain was to confirm, after making a threshold
semantic judgment, that certain ways of reading a sentence are
grammatical.21 In Facebook, the majority used the canon to do the former,
not the latter, and that appropriately set off alarm bells for Justice Alito. I,
therefore, refer to the canon as “so-called” because it is the more limited
historical principle—not the contemporary successor that the Court applied
in Facebook—that warrants adherence as a fundamental maxim of
interpretation.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the modern Supreme
Court’s textualist commitments and explains how those commitments could
lead to overformalization. Part II describes the modern series-qualifier canon
and the debates among the Justices in Facebook about its role. Part III tells
the story of the canon’s origin and then uses that history to further inform the

14

Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347, 362 (2016) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
15
See Facebook, 141 S. Ct. at 1168 & n.4.
16
See id. at 1173–75 (Alito, J., concurring).
17
BÖRJARS & BURRIDGE, supra note 8, at 13.
18
Id.
19
See 141 S. Ct. at 1173–75 (Alito, J., concurring).
20
See infra Section II.A.
21
See infra Section III.A.
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points Justice Alito advanced in his Facebook concurrence. The Essay makes
two central claims: (1) as a descriptive matter, Justice Alito properly
identified a process error in how the Facebook majority used the seriesqualifier canon; and (2) as a normative matter, errors of this sort threaten
textualism’s core commitments and goals.
I.

MODERN TEXTUALIST COMMITMENTS

A. Textualism in Action at the Supreme Court
In recent decades, textualism has “gained considerable prominence
within the federal judiciary,” particularly on the Supreme Court, even as
legal scholars remain skeptical or dismissive. 22 What textualism “is” has
already received significant theoretical attention,23 and there is no need to
rehash the answer at length. For purposes of this Essay, it suffices to describe
what leading modern judicial textualists do (or at least purport to do) with
statutory interpretation.
Justice Scalia, one of “the clearest and most influential voices” for
modern textualism, 24 described textualism’s goal as identifying “a sort of
‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reasonable person would gather from
the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”25 The
focus is not on subjective intent—e.g., the “intent of the legislature”—but on
the meaning a reasonable person would be authorized to understand that the
legislature intended with its chosen words.26 One way to privilege objectified
over subjective intent is to read statutes through the lens of ordinary English
usage, i.e., to focus on how people in the relevant community ordinarily use
and understand language. 27 Thus, for example, a hallmark of the current
22

See Tara Leigh Grove, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265, 265 (2020). A majority of
current Supreme Court Justices are generally regarded (or self-identify) as textualist or textualist-leaning.
See id. at 265 n.1 (Justice Kagan); id. at 266 (Justice Gorsuch); id. at 283 (Justice Thomas); id. at 288
n.152 (Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito); id. at 292 (then-Judge Barrett); see also, e.g., Brett M.
Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2118 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT
A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) (advancing textualist commitments).
23
See generally, e.g., Grove, supra note 22 (identifying competing textualisms); John F. Manning,
What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006) (distinguishing textualism
from purposivism, its main methodological competitor); Nelson, supra note 1 (analyzing textualism’s
foundations).
24
John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 685 (1997).
25
Scalia, supra note 2, at 17.
26
See id. at 16–17.
27
See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 2, at 121 n.52 (noting that linguistic canons have value because they
“are rules of thumb about how English speakers use language”); Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does
Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441, 443 (1990) (“Textualists, like other users of
language, want to know its context, including assumptions shared by the speakers and the intended
audience.”).
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Supreme Court’s textualism is an emphasis on the ordinary public meaning
of words at the time of enactment.28
Notably, textualist inquiry is contextual. 29 If textualism measures
objectified intent by reference to the remainder of our law, then it necessarily
focuses on the text but looks beyond the text for cues about meaning.30 And
those cues can come from a lot more places than just a dictionary or grammar
book.31 Today’s textualists attempt to divine the ordinary meaning of statutes
from broader statutory and legal context, as well as the statute’s structure,
history, and purpose, all read through the lens of basic common sense. 32
Textualism—at least in theory—is not literalism.33 Context matters.
But context is where deep divisions can arise. Professor Tara Leigh
Grove recently argued that the Supreme Court’s textualists switch between
how much emphasis they place on semantic context (what Professor Grove
calls “formalistic” textualism) and on social context (what she calls
“flexible” textualism).34 In other words, the Supreme Court’s textualists are
inconsistent about the weight they place on different contextual cues, such
as semantic or syntactic rules on the one hand and reasonable social
expectations on the other.35 These different approaches might explain, for
example, the recent divisions in Bostock v. Clayton County concerning
whether Title VII prohibits an employer from terminating an employee
simply for being homosexual or transgender.36 Each opinion in that case tried

28
See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020) (Gorsuch, J.) (looking for the
“ordinary public meaning” of Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination because of “sex”); New Prime
Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.) (looking for the ordinary meaning of “contract
of employment”). To be sure, textualists can share this commitment but disagree about how to identify
ordinary public meaning. See infra notes 34–39 and accompanying paragraph.
29
See, e.g., Grove, supra note 22, at 269 & n.27 (arguing that “emphasis on semantic context,”
particularly as compared to “social or policy context,” is “an important distinction among textualisms”);
Manning, supra note 23, at 76 (arguing that emphasis on semantic context distinguishes textualism from
purposivism, which focuses on policy context); Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 443 (noting that textualists
want to know language’s “context”).
30
Cf. Scalia, supra note 2, at 17–18.
31
See, e.g., Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1626 (2016) (Kagan, J.) (warning against just “staring
at, or even looking up, the words” at issue); Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (Scalia, J.)
(noting that a grammatical rule “is not an absolute and can assuredly be overcome by other indicia of
meaning”).
32
See, e.g., Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 179 (2014) (Kagan, J.).
33
See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 2, at 24 (stating that a “good textualist is not a literalist,” but also not
“a nihilist”); Grove, supra note 22, at 291 (“Modern textualists insist that the method is not literalism.”).
34
See Grove, supra note 22, at 266–67, 279–90.
35
See, e.g., id. at 290 n.167 (noting that “no self-proclaimed textualist on the Supreme Court has
clearly signed on to one version of textualism” and citing votes by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Thomas and Kagan as evidence of variation in approach).
36
140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020) (Gorsuch, J.).
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to claim the textualist mantle,37 at least insofar as textualism is committed to
legislative supremacy and constraining judicial discretion. 38 But whereas
Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion approached the problem formalistically
with an emphasis on semantic context, Justice Alito’s (joined by Justice
Thomas) and Justice Kavanaugh’s separate dissents placed greater emphasis
on how social and cultural context informed ordinary public meaning.39 As
Bostock shows, some textualists might be more formalistic than others.
B. Canons and the Risk of Over-Formalization
These divisions create problems for reliance on linguistic canons. At a
high level, an interpretative canon is a rule or maxim that is regarded as
“fundamental.” 40 As Judge Easterbrook (a “prominent textualist” 41 ) has
argued, “canons are inevitable, because all language depends on them.”42 But
he remains “skeptical” of canons because they all implicitly recognize that
context can override whatever default rule they provide. 43 And possible
37
See, e.g., id. at 1738 (Gorsuch, J.) (“If judges could add to, remodel, update, or detract from old
statutory terms inspired only by extratextual sources and our own imaginations, we would risk amending
statutes outside the legislative process reserved for the people’s representatives.”); id. at 1761 (Alito, J.,
joined by Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s “purport[ed] . . . purest and highest form of
textualism” because its argument “effectively amends the statutory text”); id. at 1823 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (“Under the Constitution’s separation of powers, our role as judges is to interpret and follow
the law as written, regardless of whether we like the result.”).
38
Cf., e.g., John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Idea of Judicial Restraint, 115 MICH. L. REV.
747, 754 (2017) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW (1997) (noting that textualists “invoke concerns about judicial subjectivity as a way to justify
textualism”); Grove, supra note 22, at 293 (“For many early textualists, the goal was not only to preserve
legislative supremacy but also to constrain judicial discretion.”); Barrett, supra note 2, at 113 (noting
textualist adherence to “the principle that federal courts must function as Congress’s faithful agents”);
Nelson, supra note 1, at 403 (noting that textualists are less “receptive to a background presumption of
judicial discretion”).
39
See, e.g., Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1740–41 (Gorsuch, J.) (focusing on semantic clues of Congress’s
intent to protect individuals over groups); id. at 1754–55 (Alito, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) (pointing
to extra-textual clues about Congress’s understanding of Title VII); id. at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)
(arguing that as “commonly understood, sexual orientation is distinct from, and not a form of, sex
discrimination”); Grove, supra note 22, at 281–85.
40
See Canons of Construction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
41
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Statutory Interpretation Muddle, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 269, 290 n.71
(2019); accord, e.g., Grove, supra note 22, at 273; Manning, supra note 24, at 685; see also Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1913, 1913 (1999)
(advancing a textualist defense of reading statutes in light of widely accepted background legal principles)
[hereinafter Easterbrook, Speluncean Explorers]; Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 443 (defending a socially
contextualized approach to textualism); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory
Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 60 (1988) (“The words of the statute, and not the intent
of the drafters, are the ‘law.’”).
42
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in Statutory Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 81,
84 (2017).
43
See id. at 83.
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contexts abound: There is linguistic, intratextual, and economic context;44
there is social context, drawn from “familiarity with American history and
culture”;45 and there is policy context, the favored tool of the purposivist,
which looks at “the mischief being remedied.”46 Surely there are others, too.
So, the issue with canons is that applying them—or predicting how they will
be applied—depends on which context(s) an interpreter thinks matter(s), and
how much weight each context receives relative to others.
One potential solution to this problem is to embrace formalism. A rulelike and formalistic interpretative approach may be, as Professor Grove has
argued, more likely to constrain judicial discretion and thereby preserve
legislative supremacy and judicial legitimacy—values that are central to
contemporary textualism.47 Thus, she advocates a “formalistic textualism”
that is “relatively rule-bound” and “emphasizes semantic context, rather than
social or policy context, and downplays the practical consequences of a
decision.”48
These ideals are attractive to many, and I do not quibble with them here.
But the appeal of formalistic textualism may lead interpreters to
overformalize their approach. For example, if we are told that a particular
canon reflects actual grammatical use, textualists committed to legislative
supremacy may have the temptation to rely on that canon as particularly
instructive relative to nonlinguistic contexts that can also properly inform
meaning. In pursuit of formalism and in service to textualism’s underlying
commitments, interpreters may fairly conclude that, where such a
purportedly linguistic canon applies, only other linguistic contexts can trump
its application. But if the canon does not actually reflect grammatical reality
44
Id.; see also Easterbrook, Speluncean Explorers, supra note 41, at 1913 (noting that language
“takes meaning from its linguistic context”).
45
Grove, supra note 22, at 280; cf. Easterbrook, Speluncean Explorers, supra note 41, at 1913
(“historical and governmental contexts” matter in textual interpretation); Easterbrook, supra note 27, at
443 (“language is a social enterprise” that can draw meaning from “assumptions shared by the speakers
and the intended audience”).
46
Manning, supra note 23, at 76.
47
Grove, supra note 22, at 290–307; see also, e.g., Scalia, supra note 2, at 25 (calling criticism of
formalistic interpretation “mindless” because formalism “is what makes a government a government of
laws and not of men”); cf. supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text (advancing textualist arguments by
reference to democratic values and a restrained judicial role). But see, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, The Mischief
Rule, 109 GEO. L.J. 967, 988 n.111 (2021) (arguing that “relying on context . . . can allow judges to
temper their creativity and lessen legislative surprise at their interpretations”).
48
Grove, supra note 22, at 269. Although “semantic context” might be taken to refer only to
understanding the meaning of particular words and phrases, I understand it to encompass syntactic
conventions as well, as these also explain the way a reasonable person would use language under the
circumstances. See Manning, supra note 23, at 91 (defining “semantic context”); Fallon, supra note 41,
at 272 (noting that “semantic meaning” is “defined largely by the definitions of words and the rules of
syntax and grammar” (emphasis added)).
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(i.e., if it is not really linguistic), then the interpreter may inadvertently err
by paying insufficient attention to other relevant contexts—including,
perhaps, rules that actually inform linguistic meaning—thereby potentially
undermining what the legislature communicated. Put more simply, the
temptation of formalism may lead interpreters to reflexively embrace
supposedly linguistic canons over other interpretive cues without
appropriately discerning whether the canon is all that it claims to be.49 As the
subsequent Parts argue, that is the trap into which the Facebook majority
may have fallen.
II. CONCERNS WITH THE SERIES-QUALIFIER CANON
A. Understanding the Series-Qualifier Canon
Before turning to the debate in Facebook, it will help to explain the socalled series-qualifier canon in more detail. As recited by the Supreme Court,
this canon provides that “‘[w]hen there is a straightforward, parallel
construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series,’ a modifier at the
end of the list ‘normally applies to the entire series.’”50
To understand this canon’s role, we need to start with some light
background in linguistics. We use language all the time in ways that create
ambiguity. Where syntax causes the problem, that ambiguity is “structural.”51
Sometimes the structural ambiguity is unresolvable using only the single
sentence. For instance, the lone sentence “They are cooking apples” is
ambiguous because you cannot know whether “they” are people who are
“cooking” apples (i.e., pronouns acting on a noun) or whether “they” are
“apples” with the purpose of being cooked (i.e., pronouns linked to a
subjective complement noun). To resolve the ambiguity, you need additional
context from outside of the sentence itself, such as whether the question
prompting the sentence is “What are they doing?” versus “What are they?”

49
Indeed, it is not necessarily uncommon for interpretative rules or conventions to be presented
unquestioningly as “grammatical” without much basis for that claim. Compare, e.g., Barnhart v. Thomas,
540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (Scalia, J.) (calling the last antecedent rule “grammatical”), with, e.g., Joseph
Kimble, The Doctrine of the Last Antecedent, the Example in Barnhart, Why Both Are Weak, and How
Textualism Postures, 16 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 5, 13 (2015) (arguing that the “grammatical
analysis” behind part of the last antecedent rule “is rather hazy”).
50
Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1169 (2021) (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, supra note
13, at 147 (alteration omitted)). As presented in Scalia and Garner’s Reading Law treatise, the canon
provides the same result for prepositive modifiers (i.e., those preceding a qualifying parallel construction
of nouns or verbs). See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 147. That proposition is not in tension with
linguistic principles or interpretative history in the way the postpositive claim is, and so I do not address
that aspect of the canon.
51
See BÖRJARS & BURRIDGE, supra note 8, at 24.
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But sometimes we can overcome structural ambiguity using just the
sentence itself. The lone sentence “The cop saw the thief using a telescope”
is ambiguous because the postpositive modifier “using a telescope” could
mean that the cop used a telescope to see the thief or that the cop observed
the thief’s use of a telescope. Yet other sentences with the same structure,
but different words, seem clearer to us. “The cop saw the thief using a gun”
has an intuitive meaning: The thief used the gun, and the cop saw the thief
use it. We reach this conclusion because of semantics; we know the meaning
of “saw” and the meaning of “gun,” and we do not typically associate a gun
as a tool for seeing. For simplicity, I describe this as a lack of a “semantic
match” between the words “saw” and “gun.”52
But what if I were trying to convey that the cop was ensconced atop a
building, and she used the scope mounted on a rifle to observe the thief? If
that were my purpose, then the sentence is ungrammatical not in the abstract
but only with respect to its ability to convey my intended meaning.53 To be
sure, I structured the sentence in a way that can convey my intended
message, but I failed to convey what I intended to convey because the
recipient is likely to process my message as “the cop saw, with her eyes, the
thief who was using a gun.” My central point is this: In many situations, the
way we resolve structural ambiguity using only a sentence is through
semantics; our understanding of discrete words informs how we process the
structure.
This leads to another important distinction. Today’s textualism tries to
identify how an ordinary, reasonable person would understand language.54
That is a question about how we process language, not necessarily about how
we use it. So, canons that rest on prescriptions about how best to speak, or
even that purport to describe how people actually speak, do not necessarily
address the right issue: how people make sense of what is said to them. When
we talk about the utility of particular linguistic canons, we must keep in mind
the distinction between structures that are possible (i.e., capable of being
understood to convey the intended meaning) versus understandings that are
ordinary (i.e., how the ordinary person is likely to process the structure).
Canons that shed light on the latter have more robust utility than those that
just identify the former.
52
I am borrowing “semantic matching” from computer science, where the term describes identifying
correspondences using semantic meaning. See Fausto Giunchiglia & Pavel Shvaiko, Semantic Matching,
18 KNOWLEDGE ENG’G REV. 265, 265 (2004).
53
Cf., e.g., BÖRJARS & BURRIDGE, supra note 8, at 31. In this example, we would say that “the thief
using a gun” is not a constituent (i.e., a group of words that “go together”) of the sentence, and the
sentence is ungrammatical only insofar as it conveys otherwise. See id. at 22, 31.
54
See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020) (Gorsuch, J.); New Prime Inc. v.
Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.).
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Some linguistic canons do well to describe the ordinary. Consider the
series-qualifier canon’s cousin, the last antecedent rule, which has been
justified by reference to grammatical rules prescribing where to place
modifiers to best avoid structural ambiguity. 55 That supposedly
“grammatical” rule provides that “a limiting clause or phrase . . . should
ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately
follows.”56 Thus, as the Supreme Court has reasoned, parents who warn their
teenage son, “You will be punished if you throw a party or engage in any
other activity that damages the house” have proscribed (1) any party, not just
one that damages the house, and (2) any other activity that damages the
house.57 Like other linguistic conventions, the last antecedent rule “is not an
absolute and can assuredly be overcome by other indicia of meaning,”58 i.e.,
context. And that makes sense; “we know that grammatical rules are bent
and broken all the time,”59 so we cannot cling to the idea that the ordinary
way people use and understand English always lines up with prescriptive
rules. But even if the last antecedent rule does not perfectly describe how we
use language, it has a pretty good grounding in how people process language.
Psycholinguistic evidence suggests that there is a tendency to understand a
modifier as referring to its last antecedent, just as the rule tells us. 60 Put
simply, the rule tells us which possible structure is the way we ordinarily
understand language.
The series-qualifier canon appears to be in tension with the well-settled
last antecedent rule. But that appearance is somewhat superficial. A
traditional formulation of the last antecedent rule is: “Referential and

55

See Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Travelers Cos., 585 F.3d 1366, 1371 (10th Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch,

J.).
56

Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (Scalia, J.).
Id. at 27 (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether one finds this structural reasoning persuasive
is a different matter. A fair response to this argument is that the word “other,” as used in this example,
usually implies some form of commonality, perhaps suggesting only that parties that damage the house
are forbidden. See, e.g., infra note 121 (identifying cases taking this view of the word “other”).
58
Barnhart, 540 U.S. at 26 (Scalia, J.).
59
Payless, 585 F.3d at 1371 (Gorsuch, J.).
60
See Martin J. Pickering & Roger P. G. van Gompel, Syntactic Parsing, in HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHOLINGUISTICS 455, 486 (Matthew J. Traxler & Morton A. Gernsbacher eds., 2d ed. 2006) (noting
that “[o]ne structural factor about which there is striking agreement among researchers is recency: People
prefer to attach a new phrase to a more recent than a less recent attachment site,” meaning that in
“ambiguity resolution” people “prefer more local to less local dependencies”); see also, e.g., Guillermo
Rodríguez, Relative Clause Attachment Preferences in Second Language Learners’ Parsing
Performance, 10 U. PA. WORKING PAPERS LINGUISTICS 157, 157 (2004) (reporting the “phenomenon . . .
referred to as low or late attachment” by which English users tend to attach relative clauses to nearer noun
phrases); Colin Phillips & Edward Gibson, On the Strength of the Local Attachment Preference, 26 J.
PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RSCH. 323, 324 (1997) (identifying the “local attachment preference” as “a pervasive
phenomenon in parsing”).
57
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qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer
solely to the last antecedent.”61 The series-qualifier canon takes that general
principle and expresses it in grammatical terms. Thus, the canon identifies
certain roles and structures—“a straightforward, parallel construction that
involves all nouns or verbs in a series”—and says those words are normally
all modified by a later modifier.62 In short, the canon appears to define the
extraordinary situations in which the last antecedent rule does not apply, and
the canon does so by reference to the presence of specific structures (i.e., a
series with a straightforward, parallel construction of all nouns or verbs).63
But the series-qualifier canon’s empirical basis is unclear. As discussed,
with respect to postpositive modifiers (i.e., those that come after the
modified words), the canon is in tension with the general tendency to process
words as attaching to the nearest antecedent.64 So the canon must be rooted
in either a prescriptive claim about how we should use English or a
descriptive claim about how we actually do so. In either situation, it is
unclear what the basis is for saying that modification “normally” operates as
the canon states. Start with prescription. As I explained at the start of this
Section, we often resolve structural ambiguity with semantic judgments, not
syntactic ones. That’s why the same sentence structure can be clear or
ambiguous depending on particular words used, and a structure that conveys
an intended meaning in a way that runs contrary to ordinary processing is
ungrammatical only in a limited sense.65 Thus, English does not need a hardand-fast prescriptive syntactic rule in this context because certain structures
are ambiguous or unambiguous depending on the actual words used, not in
the abstract. Nor can the canon claim particularly strong descriptive force,
given the common problem of misplaced modifiers.66 In short, it is not clear
what makes the series-qualifier canon rise to the level of a fundamental rule
or maxim about how people use or understand English, as opposed to a
general principle of what is possible for people to do in a way that is
understandable.
61
2A NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 47:33 (7th ed. 2020).
62
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 147.
63
Accord, e.g., Jama v. ICE, 543 U.S. 335, 344 n.4 (2005) (Scalia, J.) (suggesting that cases applying
a version of what is now called the series-qualifier canon “rebut the last antecedent inference” only
because they involve specific sentence structures).
64
See supra note 60 and accompanying text (noting the consensus in psycholinguistic research that
people prefer to attach a new phrase to the closest attachment site, i.e., the nearer antecedent).
65
See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying paragraphs.
66
See, e.g., Colette A. Daiute, Psycholinguistic Foundations of the Writing Process, 15 RSCH.
TEACHING ENG. 5, 13 (1981) (reporting that in a study of faulty sentences, modifier errors were
“frequent”); Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Travelers Cos., 585 F.3d 1366, 1371 (10th Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch,
J.) (observing the tendency to misplace modifiers).
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B. The Facebook Debate
Despite these issues, the series-qualifier canon recently all but decided
a case at the Supreme Court, although not without some controversy.
Facebook v. Duguid addressed the Telephone Consumer Protection Act’s
definition of an autodialer, which in relevant part must be able “to store or
produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential
number generator.”67 Everyone agreed that “using a random or sequential
number generator” modified “produce”; the issue was whether it modified
“store,” too.68
In an opinion by Justice Sotomayor, an eight-justice majority began its
textual analysis with the series-qualifier canon. 69 Calling the canon a
“conventional rule[] of grammar” that “generally reflects the most natural
reading of a sentence,” the Court started from the premise that the “most
natural construction” is to read the modifier as applying to “store” as well as
“produce.”70 That is, the Court started with a structural judgment based on a
syntactic rule. Of course, the Court did not end there; it marched through
additional textual cues that confirmed its reading, including the nature of the
modified clause, use of punctuation, and broader statutory context.71
Justice Alito concurred in the judgment. Although he agreed with the
majority’s interpretation, he expressed concern over “the Court’s heavy
reliance” on the series-qualifier canon.72 As an initial matter, he objected that
the majority treated the canon as too rule-like, noting that the canon has wellaccepted limitations.73 Justice Alito then highlighted several examples that,
in his view, call into question the Court’s claim that the canon generally
reflects the most natural reading of a sentence.74 Then Justice Alito got to the
heart of the matter: how “common understanding” informs the way we read
words.75 Rejecting the view that statutory interpretation can be reduced “to a
series of if-then computations” with canons, Justice Alito emphasized
instead “our common understanding” of social reality and familiarity with

67

47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).
Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1169 (2021).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
See id. at 1169–73.
72
Id. at 1173 (Alito, J., concurring).
73
See id. at 1173–74 (noting that “the Scalia-Garner treatise makes it clear that interpretive canons
‘are not “rules” of interpretation in any strict sense but presumptions about what an intelligently produced
text conveys’” (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 51)).
74
See id. at 1174 (suggesting that “it is very easy to think of sentences that clearly go against the
canon”).
75
Id.
68
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“English prose.”76 In short, Justice Alito rejected the idea—embraced by the
majority—that a syntactic canon can resolve structural ambiguity on its own
at the outset. Instead, Justice Alito noted that resolving structural ambiguity
often “has little to do with syntax and everything to do with our common
understanding” of the world.77
The majority responded briefly. Focusing on Justice Alito’s final point
about common understandings and general familiarity with the English
language, the majority justified its reliance on the series-qualifier canon as
“using traditional tools of statutory interpretation” to resolve “[d]ifficult
ambiguities . . . methodically . . . in order to confirm” assumptions about
common understanding.78
The back-and-forth in Facebook is yet another data point that supports
Professor Grove’s formalistic-versus-flexible textualisms observation.79 The
majority opinion starts with a rule-like way of cutting through the problem
by setting up a presumptive natural reading based on supposed rules about
syntax.80 All that remains for the rest of the opinion is to march through every
other argument and either brand it as supporting the canon’s outcome81 or
deem it insufficiently weighty to overcome the supposed general
grammatical rule.82 For his part, Justice Alito reprises his role as the flexible
textualist from Bostock. 83 He again reasons that common understanding,
informed by social reality, goes a long way to answering interpretative
problems. 84 Linguistic canons “can help” if the statutory language is
“troublesome,” but they should not be “rigid rules” that frame the entire
analysis.85

76

Id. at 1175.
Id. at 1174.
78
Id. at 1170 n.5 (majority opinion). In this connection, the majority noted that the Court “often”
applies the series-qualifier canon. See id. at 1169 (first citing Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 447
(2014), then citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339–40 (1971)).
79
See generally Grove, supra note 22 (discussing the formalistic and functionalist approaches to
textualism); supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text. Cf., e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner,
Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals,
131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1311–12 (2018) (noting a generational shift in which younger federal appellate
judges are more formalistic regardless of political background); Abbe R. Gluck, Justice Scalia’s
Unfinished Business in Statutory Interpretation: Where Textualism’s Formalism Gave Up, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2053, 2060–72 (2017) (arguing that textualism “has never been fully formalist”).
80
See Facebook, 141 S. Ct. at 1169.
81
See id. at 1169–71 (noting the clause’s integration, use of punctuation, and statutory context).
82
See id. at 1171–73 (rejecting arguments based on a semantic mismatch between “store” and
“generator,” the distributive canon, and issues of legislative purpose and policy).
83
Cf. Grove, supra note 22, at 283–85.
84
See Facebook, 141 S. Ct. at 1173–75 (Alito, J., concurring).
85
See id. at 1175.
77
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III. THE CANON THAT NEVER WAS
Justice Alito may have been a lone voice in Facebook, but his qualified
criticism of the so-called series-qualifier canon has substantial force. As I
explained in Section II.A, there are several reasons rooted in formal
linguistics to doubt the weight that the Facebook majority placed on the
canon.86 But history bears this out, too. The contemporary series-qualifier
canon is not a deep-rooted background principle of interpretation; it is an
unjustified distortion of a narrower—and more sound—principle borrowed
from an English jurist. This final Part provides an overview of that history
and how the Supreme Court mistakenly broadened the original seriesqualifier principle before again misapplying it in Facebook.
A. A Concise History of the Series-Qualifier Canon
1. Tracing the Canon to Its English Roots
The earliest Supreme Court case applying something that looks like the
contemporary series-qualifier canon is Porto Rico Railway, Light & Power
Company v. Mor,87 which is also the oldest case that Facebook cites for the
canon.88 Porto Rico Railway concerned a statute providing jurisdiction over
certain “controversies where all of the parties on either side . . . are citizens
or subjects of a foreign State or States, or citizens of a State, Territory, or
District of the United States not domiciled in Porto Rico.”89 The issue was
whether “not domiciled in Porto Rico” applied to the entire phrase preceding
it, including “citizens or subjects of a foreign State or States.”90 Textually,
the Court reasoned that it did: “When several words are followed by a clause
which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the
natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as
applicable to all.”91 This is a syntactic judgment about how people structure
and understand sentences.
Porto Rico Railway was not decided on a blank slate; it relied on two
earlier cases to support its textual rule: Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co. and

86

See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying paragraph.
253 U.S. 345, 348 (1920).
88
See 141 S. Ct. at 1169.
89
Porto Rico Ry., 253 U.S. at 346.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 348. The Court bolstered its reasoning with policy, concluding that “Congress could not have
intended” to grant jurisdiction where “a domiciled alien is a party while denying under similar
circumstances jurisdiction where a domiciled American is a party.” Id. at 349.
87
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United States v. Standard Brewery.92 But neither of those cases supported
Porto Rico Railway’s sweeping claim about sentence structures.
The older of those cases, Johnson v. Southern Pacific, involved a
drafting error. An 1893 act provided that locomotive cars be “equipped with
couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled
without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars.” 93 In
rejecting the argument that “without the necessity . . .” applied only to the
act of uncoupling, but not to coupling, the Court determined that there was a
missing comma after “uncoupled.”94 Reading the missing comma into the
text, “as it should be,” the phrase “and which can be uncoupled” was an
attribute of the “couplers,” and “without the necessity . . .” applied to both
coupling and uncoupling.95 That reasoning—heavily dependent on comma
placement—accords with the still-prevailing rule that a “qualifying phrase
separated from antecedents by a comma is evidence that the qualifier is
supposed to apply to all the antecedents instead of only to the immediately
preceding one.”96 In short, the Court’s reasoning seemed to turn on a wholly
distinct rule that was not applicable in Porto Rico Railway at all.
The more interesting case is Standard Brewery, which identifies the
series-qualifier canon’s true origin. Standard Brewery concerned a
prohibition on the manufacture and sale of “beer, wine or other intoxicating
malt or vinous liquors for beverage purposes.”97 At issue was whether the
statute prohibited beer containing no more than one-half of one percent of
alcohol, which was not “intoxicating” as a matter of law. 98 In the
government’s view, this did not matter because “the intention was to include
beer and wine whether intoxicating or not.” 99 The Court rejected that
argument, reasoning that “the framers of the statute intentionally used the
phrase ‘other intoxicating’ as relating to and defining the immediately
preceding designation of beer and wine.”100 For support, the Court borrowed
from the English jurist Lord Bramwell: “As a matter of ordinary
construction, where several words are followed by a general expression as

92
See id. at 348 (first citing United States v. Standard Brewery, 251 U.S. 210, 218 (1920), then citing
Johnson v. S. Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1904)).
93
Johnson, 196 U.S. at 13.
94
Id. at 18–19.
95
See id.
96
SINGER & SINGER, supra note 61, at § 47:33.
97
251 U.S. at 218.
98
Id. at 215, 220.
99
Id. at 218.
100
Id.
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here, which is as much applicable to the first and other words as to the last,
that expression is not limited to the last, but applies to all.”101
Note that Standard Brewery did not deal with the issue presented in
Facebook or Porto Rico Railway. Instead, Standard Brewery dealt with a
semantic issue about the meaning of the words “beer” and “wine,” an issue
informed by the meaning of “other intoxicating.” But Standard Brewery is
interesting because it points us to the ultimate source of what has morphed
into the series-qualifier canon: Lord Bramwell’s opinion in the English Great
Western Railway case.
Great Western Railway was a dispute involving a special statutory
easement,102 and the case turned on an interpretation of the Land Clauses
Consolidation Act.103 One railway sought to exercise its statutory easement
on another railway’s property, but the railway in possession of the property
objected that under the Land Clauses Consolidation Act, there could be no
“compulsory taking of Land” (i.e., the easement) because the buying railway
had not subscribed “the whole of the Capital or estimated Sum for defraying
the Expences [sic] of the Undertaking”104 as the Act required.105 The basic
issue, as Lord Bramwell saw it, was whether the easement counted as “lands”
under the Act. 106 On that score, the Act defined “lands” as extending to
“Messuages, Lands, Tenements, and Hereditaments, of any Tenure.” 107 It
was with respect to the “of any tenure” language that Lord Bramwell spoke
when discussing the “ordinary construction” of sentences.108
It is worth walking carefully through Lord Bramwell’s analysis. Lord
Bramwell set out to determine whether the statutory easement was an
incorporeal hereditament and therefore within the Act’s definition of
“land.”109 Lord Bramwell began by confessing that his first instinct was that
hereditaments were included in the statutory definition only if they had some
tenure, i.e., that a “tenure” was a requirement, but only for hereditaments.110
101
Id. (quoting Great W. Ry. Co. v. Swindon & Cheltenham Extension Ry. Co. [1884] 9 App. Cas.
787 (HL) 808 (appeal taken from Eng.) (opinion of Bramwell)).
102
Great W. Ry. Co., 9 App. Cas. at 791–92 (opinion of FitzGerald); see id. at 807–08 (opinion of
Bramwell).
103
Land Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 18 (Eng.); see Great W. Ry. Co., 9 App.
Cas. at 808 (opinion of Bramwell).
104
Land Clauses Consolidation Act § 16.
105
Great W. Ry. Co., 9 App. Cas. At 787.
106
Id. at 807–08 (opinion of Bramwell).
107
Land Clauses Consolidation Act § 3.
108
Great W. Ry. Co., 9 App. Cas. at 808 (opinion of Bramwell).
109
See id. As a bit of background, at common law an incorporeal hereditament referred to interests
that “existed only in contemplation of law.” E.g., Nat’l Supply Co. v. McLeod, 227 P. 350, 350 (Kan.
1924).
110
Great W. Ry. Co., 9 App. Cas. at 808 (opinion of Bramwell).
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In short, his first instinct was to apply the last antecedent rule. But then Lord
Bramwell realized that was not the necessary reading. By analogy to the
statement “horses, oxen, pigs, and sheep, from whatever country they may
come,” he realized that “a general expression” at the end of “several words”
can sometimes be “as much applicable to the first and other words as to the
last.”111 In fact, he thought it would have been nonsensical to limit “of any
tenure” only to hereditaments because other items on the list readily match
the phrase, too.112 So, Lord Bramwell arrived at the conclusion that “of any
tenure” referred to each item on the list but as a “general expression” of
breadth rather than a strict requirement that there be some tenure.113
Focus on what Lord Bramwell did not do. He did not start his analysis
with the sentence’s structure; his structural point arose only after he
concluded that “of any tenure” was a semantic match with every item on the
list. 114 As he says, the “ordinary construction”—i.e., his claim about
understanding sentences—applies where the “general expression . . . is as
much applicable to the first and other words as to the last.”115 Thus, Lord
Bramwell’s syntactic observation only bolsters his implicit prior semantic
conclusion: There is a semantic match between “of any tenure” and each of
“messuages, lands, tenements, and hereditaments,” and it is not
ungrammatical to read the modifier as attaching to each antecedent. Note
also that “of any tenure” is not just any qualifier; it is an expression of breadth
and one that is “general.”116 Lord Bramwell’s limited principle is that where
an integrated list ends with a broad, general expression that semantically
matches every item on the list, it is “ordinary” to construe the expression as
applicable to the entire list.117
Lord Bramwell’s claim should not be haphazardly extended beyond the
situation before him: an integrated list ending with a broad qualifier that
semantically matches each item on the list. Indeed, even the example to
which he analogizes follows the same convention as the statute he
interprets. 118 Thus, Lord Bramwell’s observation applies to “wines and
111

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. (“If the general expression is limited to ‘hereditaments,’ then it does not extend to
messuages, lands, and tenements, except as included in hereditaments, which cannot be the case.”).
113
See id. (“[T]he general words apply to those of the antecedent to which they are applicable and
not to the others, and the words are to be read as ‘of whatever tenure, if any.’”).
114
See id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
See id. at 808–09.
118
See id. (analogizing to “horses, oxen, pigs, and sheep, from whatever country they may come”).
Of note, the statute and Lord Bramwell’s example both set off the qualifier with a comma, which under
112
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cheeses of any age” or “justices, judges, and magistrates of whatever
methodological commitment.” In each example, the postpositive modifier is
(1) a semantic match to each item on the list and (2) broad and inclusive
(because of the words “any” and “whatever”). But Lord Bramwell never
speaks to issues like “Englishmen, Canadians, and Americans not domiciled
in the United States,” which ends with a restrictive phrase that semantically
matches each of the three nationalities, but which also could identify only a
subset of Americans with something likely in common with Englishmen and
Canadians (i.e., not being domiciled in the United States). In that last
example, Lord Bramwell might simply tell us that we need another cue to
make a final interpretation, like the presence or absence of a comma after
“Americans.” 119 His principle, however, does not necessarily supply an
answer on its own.
2. How the Supreme Court Went Astray
On this side of the Atlantic, the nuance of Lord Bramwell’s analysis
was lost. Standard Brewery extended Lord Bramwell’s observation to a new
context, albeit one that still made linguistic sense.120 A reference to “other
intoxicating” beverages at the end of a list does imply that the preceding
“beer” and “wine” refers to intoxicating versions of those drinks. But that is
because of the semantic meaning of “other,” not just syntax.121
The real culprit in distorting Lord Bramwell’s syntactic observation
was Justice Brandeis’s Porto Rico Railway opinion. 122 Indeed, Justice
Brandeis made two significant changes in reciting Lord Bramwell’s narrow
principle. Whereas Lord Bramwell was concerned with a “general
expression,” 123 Justice Brandeis broadened the rule to encompass any
“clause.” 124 So, while Lord Bramwell was speaking about statements of
breadth,125 Justice Brandeis extended the rule to restrictive modifiers as well.
And whereas Lord Bramwell spoke of what “ordinary construction”

a different interpretative convention suggests application to all antecedents. See supra note 96 and
accompanying text. But Lord Bramwell did not appear to attach significance to the comma.
119
Cf. supra note 96 and accompanying text.
120
See supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text.
121
See, e.g., NOAA Md., LLC v. Adm’r of the Gen. Servs. Admin., 997 F.3d 1159, 1168 (Fed. Cir.
2021) (stating that the “word ‘other’ . . . suggests a commonality of theme”); Transco Expl. Co. v. Pac.
Emps. Ins. Co., 869 F.2d 862, 865 (5th Cir. 1989) (observing that “normally the word ‘other’ is to be
used only when comparing things belonging to the same group”).
122
See Porto Rico Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Mor, 253 U.S. 345, 348 (1920).
123
Great W. Ry. Co., 9 App. Cas. at 808 (opinion of Bramwell).
124
Porto Rico Ry., 253 U.S. at 348.
125
See supra notes 116–117 and accompanying text.
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permits, 126 Justice Brandeis spoke of what a “natural construction . . .
demands.”127 Thus, Porto Rico Railway recites a rule broader in scope and
stricter in application than Lord Bramwell’s principle. That change is
justified neither by Standard Brewery nor Johnson, on which Porto Rico
Railway relies. 128 Nor did Justice Brandeis articulate any other linguistic
basis for his formulation. Perhaps he was simply inattentive, or perhaps he
just needed to make a forceful rhetorical point to persuade others of his
position. While the reasons for the revision are unclear, the consequence is
not: The Supreme Court has come to treat a misstatement as a rule.129
This was not inevitable. Before Facebook, the Supreme Court generally
recognized that Porto Rico Railway’s so-called rule applied only very
narrowly. In United States v. Bass, the Court made the semantic judgment
that “in commerce or affecting commerce” is a semantic match for the verbs
“receives,” “possesses,” and “transports,” and then applied the Porto Rico
Railway rule to conclude that “the more plausible construction here is that it
in fact applies to all three”—something the Court conceded was just the
“beginning” of its reasoning because “the argument is certainly neither
overwhelming nor decisive.”130 Decades later, the Court cast the Porto Rico
Railway rule as just a means “to rebut the last antecedent inference” and
applicable where the “modifying clause appeared . . . at the end of a single,
integrated list.”131 That, notably, is a close description of Lord Bramwell’s
principle.132 Next, in Paroline v. United States, the Court invoked Porto Rico
Railway to support reading the modifier “as a proximate result of the
offense” as applicable to an entire set of antecedents.133 But Paroline was
actually a case in the mold of Standard Brewery; the last antecedent was a
catchall that referred broadly to “other losses suffered,” which—like
Standard Brewery’s “other intoxicating” language—informed the earlier
antecedents for semantic reasons, not structural ones.134 And in Lockhart v.
United States, the Court summed this all up: The series-qualifier canon (at

126
Great W. Ry. Co., 9 App. Cas. at 808 (opinion of Bramwell); see supra notes 114–117 and
accompanying paragraph.
127
Porto Rico Ry., 253 U.S. at 348 (emphasis added).
128
See supra notes 92–101 and accompanying text.
129
See Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1169 (2021).
130
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339–40 (1971).
131
See Jama v. ICE, 543 U.S. 335, 344 n.4 (2005) (Scalia, J.) (first citing Bass, 404 U.S. at 337, 339,
then citing United States v. Standard Brewery, Inc., 251 U.S. 210, 218 (1920), then citing United States
v. United Verde Copper Co., 196 U.S. 207, 213 (1905)).
132
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
133
Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 447 (2014).
134
See id.

217

NORTHWESTERNUNIVERSITYLAWREVIEWONLINE

the time referred to as a “principle”) was not a “grammatical mandate” but a
way to describe certain contexts that can rebut the last antecedent rule.135
Nevertheless, the Facebook majority—drawing on a single treatise and
Porto Rico Railway and its progeny—cited the series-qualifier canon as a
“traditional tool[] of statutory interpretation” built on “rules of grammar”
that “generally reflects the most natural reading of a sentence.”136 Each of
those descriptions is wrong. The Facebook majority’s so-called seriesqualifier canon is not traditional; it differs markedly from the narrower
principle that Lord Bramwell recognized and that the Supreme Court first
applied in Standard Brewery.137 Indeed, the canon even differs materially
from Porto Rico Railway, the case that first reformulated the underlying
principle in a broader—and erroneous—way.138 Even Porto Rico Railway
recognized that the principle applies only after a semantic match has been
confirmed. 139 Nor is the canon a rule of grammar. The canon does not
describe how people generally use language,140 and it seems flatly at odds
with research on how people process ambiguous structures141—a fact that
contradicts the claim that the “canon generally reflects the most natural
reading of a sentence.”142 The so-called series-qualifier canon does nothing
more than reformulate a misstated principle from a long-dated case.
B. Facebook’s Process Error
This is not to say that a series-qualifier-like principle has no role in
statutory interpretation. The principle confirms that where there is a semantic
match between a broad postpositive modifier and multiple antecedents
structured together, there is nothing unnatural about reading the modifier as
applying to each antecedent. As discussed, Lord Bramwell’s initial
principle—even as applied in Porto Rico Railway—bakes in a threshold
semantic determination. Before the series-qualifier principle applies, the
interpreter must first determine that the modifier is “applicable” to each
135
577 U.S. 347, 355 (2016). In this connection, note that Lord Bramwell’s principle—which applies
where the modifier is broad—provides a natural complement to the last antecedent rule, which the Court
has previously explained applies where the modifier is “limiting.” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26
(2003) (Scalia, J.).
136
Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1169, 1170 n.5 (2021) (first citing SCALIA & GARNER,
supra note 13, at 147, then citing Paroline, 572 U.S. at 447, then citing Bass, 404 U.S. at 339–40).
137
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138
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139
Compare Porto Rico Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Mor, 253 U.S. 345, 348 (1920) (the rule applies
where the modifier “is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last”), with Facebook,
141 S. Ct. at 1169 (no such limitation).
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See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
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potentially relevant antecedent. 143 After identifying a semantic match, the
principle (as properly articulated by Lord Bramwell, not as inexplicably
altered in Porto Rico Railway) confirms that application of the modifier to
each semantically matching antecedent is syntactically permissible.144 The
principle’s narrow role is to say that a particular reading need not be ruled
out as ungrammatical and, by extension, as unlikely to reflect ordinary public
meaning. Given that narrow role, the Court was exactly right in Bass when
it said the principle is “neither overwhelming nor decisive.”145
But the Facebook majority works backward. One of the contested issues
in Facebook was whether there was a semantic match between the modifier
and one potential antecedent. Recall that the relevant modifier is “using a
random or sequential number generator,” and the possible antecedents were
two verbs relating to telephone numbers: “to store” (the further removed
antecedent) and “produce” (the last antecedent). 146 There is nothing
semantically absurd about using a “number generator” to “produce telephone
numbers.” But it is less intuitive that a number generator would store those
numbers. Ultimately, the Court rejected any semantic mismatch between
“store” and “generator,” but only by resorting to technical intricacies and
policy concerns. 147 Indeed, the majority conceded “that, as a matter of
ordinary parlance, it is odd to say that a piece of equipment ‘stores’ numbers
using a random number ‘generator.’” 148 But the Court brushed that aside
because it already stacked the deck: Having applied the series-qualifier
canon as its first analytical move,149 the Court casts the semantic arguments
as “contrary to the ordinary reading of the text.” 150 That is exactly
backward—you need to establish a semantic match before the seriesqualifier principle ever comes into play. Only after making the semantic and
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(appeal taken from Eng.) (opinion of Bramwell); Porto Rico Ry., 253 U.S. at 348.
144
See supra notes 114–117 and accompanying paragraph.
145
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 340 (1971).
146
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syntactic determination is there arguably an “ordinary reading” established
as a baseline. More simply, the majority put the cart before the horse.
This is the basic issue that Justice Alito identified. The central theme of
Justice Alito’s concurrence is that the common sense application of English
semantics does most of the work. So, for example, in the sentence
“[S]tudents must not complete or check any homework to be turned in for a
grade, using online homework-help websites,” Justice Alito argues that the
series-qualifier canon does not resolve the reach of “using online homeworkhelp websites.”151 As he explains, our understanding “has little to do with
syntax and everything to do with our common understanding that teachers
do not want to prohibit students from doing homework.” 152 Justice Alito
worries that the majority’s resolution of the question as a problem of syntax,
rather than one of semantics and social context, will lead lower courts astray
if they begin treating statutory interpretation as mechanical and algorithmic
rather than contextual and informed by common sense drawn from social
experience. 153 With these observations, Justice Alito alludes to the
methodological problem: The Facebook majority committed a process error.
By that I mean that the Facebook majority took a syntactic principle designed
to confirm the permissibility of a semantics-based interpretation and turned
it into a principle that establishes the interpretation in the first instance.154
Why did this process error occur? The simplest answer is that the
Facebook majority had no good reason to think it was making an error. By
its terms, the so-called series-qualifier canon makes a broad claim about how
English works, and it does so with Justice Scalia’s leading textualist
imprimatur. Those who have not done the legwork to critically assess the
canon’s grammatical or historical bases have no reason to suspect that the
canon claims to resolve more than it can. On the surface, the canon’s
linguistic and historic pedigree looks as good as any other textualist’s tool.
Perhaps, however, the Facebook majority used the canon so forcefully
because it allowed the majority to write a quick and easy opinion. By the
time Facebook reached the Court, much ink had been spilled across the
circuits grappling with the interpretive issue.155 As then-Judge Barrett wrote
for the Seventh Circuit, there are “at least four ways” of reading the statutory
151
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text at issue in Facebook. 156 Rather than get deep in the weeds of each—as
Justice Barrett did for the Seventh Circuit157—the majority may have thought
that the series-qualifier canon is a relatively sound, rule-like way to quickly
justify the answer that the full Court agreed was correct. If that is the
explanation, then the Facebook majority’s strategy has rhetorical appeal. An
easy way to get around hard questions is to identify a rule that purports to
cut through the arguments and supply a presumptive answer. By using the
series-qualifier canon as it did, the Facebook majority could simply dismiss
the serious semantic arguments about a mismatch between “store” and
“generator” as good-but-not-good-enough.158
Regardless of explanation, textualists should not celebrate Facebook’s
approach. Rule-like formality in textualism may well produce benefits like
the preservation of judicial legitimacy,159 but textualism’s ultimate objective
is to faithfully carry out the legislative directive as ordinary people would
understand it.160 That the series-qualifier canon is rule-like is not a good in
itself, nor is the fact that it is a rule that can make hard cases appear easy.
Rules are valuable to the extent that they constrain interpretive discretion
toward outcomes that accord with what ordinary people would understand
words to mean, thereby furthering important democratic values.
If we take these values seriously, then we should heed Justice Alito’s
warning. In its original (and defensible) form, Lord Bramwell’s seriesqualifier principle merely confirmed that certain structures are possible, but
not necessarily ordinary in all circumstances (e.g., where the modifier is
restrictive rather than broad and general). The contemporary so-called seriesqualifier canon claims to do much more but, if strictly applied, will not
always live up to that promise—for example, in situations of potential
semantic mismatch between a modifier and all items on an integrated list.
Yes, there will be instances in which the canon yields the right result, but
those instances will be happy accidents and not the product of settled,
generally accepted linguistic conventions. If lower courts begin to use the
canon as the Facebook majority did, the result may be to undermine rather
than to advance textualism’s commitment to identifying objectified intent.
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Essay has been to shed light on the historical and
theoretical bases for the contemporary so-called series-qualifier canon. I
argue that both as a matter of sound linguistics and historical interpretative
practice, the series-qualifier canon as articulated and applied by the majority
in Facebook has no basis. That is not to say that the general principle is of
no value. I acknowledge that a narrower version of a series-qualifier
principle is a legitimate tool of interpretation. But like any tool, it can be
misused. By using the so-called series-qualifier canon to establish a baseline
interpretative outcome, the majority in Facebook misused the principle to
prove a proposition that the principle was historically never intended to
establish in the absence of a threshold semantic judgment. Recognizing that
process error validates Justice Alito’s concern that lower courts may be led
astray by the Facebook majority’s rush to use so-called rules when common
sense does the job. But at a broader level, the Facebook error is a reminder
not to let conventional or inherited wisdom about supposed linguistic
conventions go unexplored or unchallenged.
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